I received a striking lesson in dichotomy this weekend. I spent last week in Munich, where we enjoyed the comestibles and potables that make the country famous. At the end of the week, when we were preparing to leave for home, we were instructed to travel to a troubled manufacturing facility in Slovakia. 2 plane flights later, and we were in eastern Slovakia. I had heard stories of the depressed region, but noting is quite as shocking as witnessing it in person. ![]() (from my hotel room window in Slovakia) We checked into our hotel room in the middle of the night, so I was spared the view from the room window (pictured above). To be fair, the hotel was not bad, but it was surrounded by images that were much the same as the one in the picture. As we traveled to the plant, the view was depressing. The cold, unimaginative depictions of cold War-era bloc countries was cast in stark relief to the previous days in Germany. The scene more closely resembled a war zone than a functioning country. Most of the storefronts were either pizza shops (there were lots of them), or bars. The poverty that gripped the country was evident at the pizza shops: for 99 Slovak Crowns, you could buy a full pizza - a good one, too. An exchange rate of 33:1 gives you an idea of the relationship. 75 cent beers were easy to find, even the good stuff. With all of this in mind, we arrived at the plant. Upon entering, we noticed an acrid scent that permeated the 150,000+ square foot facility. A quick inspection showed the reason - unvented welding stations... dozens of them. A thin blue haze hung in the air. Here and there, hundreds of workers scurried to and fro, collecting and assembling various parts like some sort of semi-comedic fire drill - only, it wasn't a joke. The plant employees worked 12 hour days for about $5 in take-home pay. We ascended 6 steps into the office area of the plant. Upon meeting the office staff, the reason for the steps was revealed - there was a legit Cold War nuclear bunker under the plant. almost 5 feet of alternating steel plate and reinforced concrete separated the bunker from the plant floor. The bunker was almost as large as the plant, and reminded me of the Greenbrier bunker in West Virginia - minus any of the frill. The Greenbrier was designed to hold the government secure during a war, and the Slovakian bunker had many of the same features. ![]() ![]() One does not need to be particularly observant to see the similarities. This brings immediately to mind the "Us vs. Them" scenario that played out during the Cold War. Americans were absolutely convinced that the big, bad Soviets we going to nuke us any day now. As is obvious by the Slovakian shelter, the Soviets felt much the same way about us. In fact, when we look at the data, we see that the Soviets had much more firepower than we did. It seems that their defenses were superior as well. So, what happened? It is logical to assume that the analysis of counter-strike vs. finite deterrence was in play here. If we look at the graph linked above, we see that the size of the US nuclear arsenal was essentially stable from 1975 until the end of the Cold War. The Soviets, by contrast, continued to ramp up their stockpile to greater than 3 times the US level by 1980. This corresponds with the 3x requirement favored by most counter-strike proponents. This, coupled with the construction of multiple fallout bunkers like the one in Slovakia, must have cost the Soviet government billions of dollars. In the review of Cold War tactics, this was a consideration. Taken from Living With Peril, we see the following excerpt: The obvious lesson was to avoid talking about no-first-use whenever possible. But in its rejection of a full first-strike capability, the administration remained firm. First, the strategy was unfeasible, because even a devastating first strike inevitably would miss Soviet submarines at sea. Second, the buildup necessary to reach a first-strike capability would provoke an arms race. And third, it would be very costly ... At the time of Kennedy's budget message, support for a strategy of finite deterrence was centered in the White House staff. The decision would prove vital in ending the Cold War. While the Soviets continued to spend, the finite deterrence kept the superior force at bay. ultimately, the Soviet government succumbed to bankruptcy, and one of the major reasons for it was military spending. They spent more , but we were smarter with our money. Just the opposite of what is happening now in the world. Beware. |
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