Supreme Court Decisis

The US Supreme Court ruled today in the case of Gonzales v. Carhart, better-known as the partial birth abortion case. There has been much analysis of the decision today, and undoubtedly more will come as the opinions are dissected - Jack Balkin does a fairly thorough job of analysis on the possible problems and loopholes in the decision, albeit specifically from the liberal side of the debate. To me, whether or not this particular decision is flawed is not nearly as relevant of the stark example of the problems with the prevailing legal policy of stare decisis. The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit defines stare decisis as: Stare decisis is the policy of the court to stand by precedent; the term is but an abbreviation of stare decisis et non quieta movere — "to stand by and adhere to decisions and not disturb what is settled." Basically, this means that when judges try a case they will check to see if a similar case has come before a court previously, and if there was a precedent set by an equal or higher court, then the judge should follow that precedent. The stare decisis conflict in Gonzales v. Carhart shows when compared to the earlier Stenberg v. Carhart in 2000. Today's partial-birth decision is not easily reconcilable with the majority opinion in Stenberg v. Carhart seven years ago. Stare decisis suggests that, assuming that a justice feels that a previous decision was unconstitutional, a court should prefer the earlier departure from the Constitution to the correct understanding of the Constitution. This is directly contrary to the reasoning of Marbury v. Madison, which says in part: If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each. So if a law [e.g., a statute or treaty] be in opposition to the constitution: if both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law: the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty. Stare decisis issues are described here by Michael Stokes Paulsen, who says: But of course the doctrine of stare decisis is not taken seriously, and with good reason. Rarely, if ever, does the Supreme Court, or any individual justice, reach an outcome different from how the Court (or justice) would decide the matter independent of precedent. (Ironically, Planned Parenthood v. Casey may be the one true, significant counterexample.) Usually, stare decisis is just a dishonest or disingenuous cover for a decision reached on other grounds. And, as Gonzales v. Carhart today shows, stare decisis does not truly constrain departures from prior decisions either. I believe that the most important part of today's decision is not the decision itself, but the fact that stare decisis is either overtly ignored (in some cases), or used as an explanation for a verdict that is motivated by completely ulterior objectives. If stare decisis is to be used as an integral part of US legal policy, this looseness of interpretation must be resolved. Stare decisis affects more portions of the law and of American life than any abortion decision ever could. As such, it must be protected more rigorously than any particular case, or it will be transformed into a shoddy political tool, to be used to further political agendas instead of determining the legality of a situation. Assuming that hasn't already happened.