Foresight - 20/20?

Reader feedback regarding my post The Iraq Plan. The reader and I talked about another war games simulation that was run in 2002. It is mentioned by Lt. Gen. William Wallace, commander of U.S. Army forces in the Persian Gulf. Wallace said, "The enemy we're fighting is a bit different than the one we war-gamed against." The readers comments: The War Games that I was referring to were called Millennium Challenge 02, and took place later than I recalled (’02, believe it or not. It’s hard to imagine by the name, huh?). The General’s name was Paul Van Riper. Here are a few articles about the games; some of the things that he did then are eerily similar to what is going on now. I did find a recent interview and quotes from Gen. Van Riper. He has great disdain for Donald Rumsfeld, and makes some vicious comments about him. Is such a thing possible? The articles he references begin with this one from Australia. It seems that in 2002, General Van Riper was to command the "Middle East" forces in war games against the US military. He did far too good a job, defeating a large contingent of the US landing party; it was so bad, the war games had to be re-started and Van Riper received new orders: "We were directed ... to move air defences so that the army and marine units could successfully land," Instead of analyzing the tactics used by Van Riper and developing strategies to defeat them, the enemies were simply told that they weren't playing fair. Maybe we should try that in Iraq now. More damning evidence comes from this article in The Slate. It details much the same information, but contains many quotes from Van Riper on the subject, like this one: "You don't come to a conclusion beforehand and then work your way to that conclusion. You see how the thing plays out." He added, somewhat ominously in retrospect, "My main concern was we'd see future forces trying to use these things when they've never been properly grounded in any sort of an experiment." Ouch. These are the same tactics that are being used in Iraq now, and we are surprised that they are not working as well as in the war games. When you restrict the capabilities of the enemy artificially, it is easier to win. This article regarding the effects of the military setbacks in Iraq, from 2003, illustrates the point. The enemy is not reacting the same way as they did in the war games, because the real enemy has alternatives that the simulated enemy did not. The goal of war games simulation is to determine weakness in the military strategy, and to determine effective countermeasures for those weaknesses. If all weaknesses are obscured by the "rules", the war games are worthless. A PBS Frontline interview with Van Riper here shows some revealing commentary from the general. He doesn't have much use for civilian authority in military affairs - not surprising, perhaps, but his commentary is certainly jaded: "My belief is Mr. Rumsfeld came in believing he could pay for high-tech weapons, particularly some of the things in terms of missile defense, space-based systems, by cutting two more divisions out of the Army. So his idea of transformation, I think, was pare the Army down in terms of the force structure, use the money for high tech. Professionally unschooled...There was a school, of which I'm firmly a part, that believed that you really had to understand war on the ground before you understood war as a total entity, and felt that yes, the military needed to be cut back with the demise of the Soviet Union. Where we were cutting it, where we were putting our money, was wrong. We went from 16 Army divisions down to 10. And of course Mr. Rumsfeld, when he came in, wanted to take it down to eight. That was our concern, those of us in that school, that the money wasn't being spent in the right places. And yes, those forces were stretched." When questions turn to Iraq, my favorite question was: "Four days after 9/11, [National Security Advisor] Condoleezza Rice and Paul Wolfowitz and others make an argument, and they say: "It's hard to fight a shadow; it's hard to chase Al Qaeda. But states fight states, and we know a lot about Iraq. These are bad guys; let's go get them." What do you say?" Read again that this is 4 DAYS after 9/11, and our leadership it talking about invading Iraq - not finding the terrorists, or Bin Laden, or making us safe, but Iraq. Van Riper gives a great answer: "Here's an analogy, perhaps a strange, strained analogy. Let's suppose you were mugged on a street in your neighborhood and you had no idea who the mugger was. You may be suspicious, but you weren't sure. But there was another neighbor you didn't like. You'd had a lot of quarrels with him, and so you decide, "I'm going to solve this problem because I'm going to go burn down that neighbor's house." There's no connection. That's how I equate going after Iraq for what happened on 9/11 or trying to make that case." It seems the general has put some thought into this. I wish our leadership had done the same. This story has amazing parallels to the Revolutionary War. In the Revolution, the British were the big, bad military power, with more money, troops, training, unity, and everything else that seems materially important. I read a very cool essay written by a student about this, part of which is poster here. The Pre-amble: "The military forces of the British were gigantic. With a strong naval force and well-trained soldiers, the British Empire was invincible. When time came to fight the colonies the British armies held nothing back. With about seven million strong, the British army would decide to stop the colonial rebellion. The empire also decided to hire 30,000 German Hessians. Also with 50,000 loyalist and Native Americans in the colonies nothing could stop them. Their superior Navy was their strong point. This country could supply its forces with supplies and were much wealthier than the American colonist. However, even with all these advantages it seemed like a new kind of war for the British. Fighting 3000 miles away from the motherland was very hard to do. Supplies were difficult to send and in addition to that Ireland and French seemed posed to strike at any time. Also without the great command of William Pitt, who brought his son out of the Revolutionary War, the British were stuck with mediocre generals. Their was also no plan of attack, meaning that their were no single targets that would injure the colonist. Most of the British had no intention to fight their cousins in America. Also some of the troops were afraid that George III would turn tyrannical with a win. On the other hand American colonist were mentally prepared for their independence and secession from England. With good leaders such as George Washington, and strong moral support from Benjamin Franklin and Paine’s “Common Sense” troops in the Colonies were ready for a War. French aid also came in indirect forms. The Americans defensive strategy gave them military advantages. Even with poor equipment Colonial Marksmen were superior to the British." Seems alot like our current predicament, doesn't it? A much larger, better equipped and better trained force against a rag-tag force with few advantages. However, the colonists used the advantages they had. From this article: "Unconventional war tactics; marked by unpredictability. a. Unconventional war tactics, such as attacking in nonlinear formation and hiding in natural terrain, were employed. " The average British citizen thought these tactics un-gentlemanly, and spoke down to the colonists. A quote from Jimmy Carter's speaking engagement at Sundance: In his address, Carter said “The Hornet’s Nest” is the first fictional work by a U.S. president. “When I was about halfway through, I could understand why,” he said, drawing laughs from the audience. The former president said writers have addressed conflicts such as Vietnam and the Civil War at great lengths, but not as much has been written about the pivotal conflict that led to American independence. “This was by far the most vicious war in America’s history,” he said. Early colonial life meant that at various times colonists were required to swear their allegiance to England and its king, he said. But the tides were turning. “One by one — literally — the American colonists violated that oath to London and became a revolutionary, or, as the British would have said then — a terrorist.” Hmmm... terrorists? Shouldn't the greatest army on earth (at the time) have been able to defeat some small group of rabble-rousers and terrorists? Remember, however, that no matter what the colonists were called, they won the war, and the big, bad occupying force was expelled. Could the same thing happen again?