The Iraq Plan

For those that still think that the Iraq plan is not a colossal failure (yes, these people do exist), check this out. It's the 2002 war plan... only 5000 troops left in Iraq by 2006. This is in direct contrast to a 1999 simulation run by United States Central Command (CENTCOM), known as "Desert Crossing". This simulation was designed to assess potential outcomes of an invasion of Iraq, particularly an invasion aimed at eliminated Saddam Hussein. It is posted in the National Security Archive here. Some of the conclusions from Desert Crossing: "The report forewarned that regime change may cause regional instability by opening the doors to "rival forces bidding for power" which, in turn, could cause societal "fragmentation along religious and/or ethnic lines" and antagonize "aggressive neighbors." Further, the report illuminated worries that secure borders and a restoration of civil order may not be enough to stabilize Iraq if the replacement government were perceived as weak, subservient to outside powers, or out of touch with other regional governments. An exit strategy, the report said, would also be complicated by differing visions for a post-Saddam Iraq among those involved in the conflict." It seems that we can make accurate projections, if we look at them objectively instead of politically. However, our leaders seem to think that their "instincts" offer much better strategic insight than the most advanced military analysis we have available. They should be ashamed - but they aren't. Shouldn't that tell us something?